2012 Decisions

Opinions of the United
States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit

2-29-2012

Atlantic Health System v. Natl Union Fire Ins Co of Pitt

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012

Recommended Citation
"Atlantic Health System v. Natl Union Fire Ins Co of Pitt" (2012). 2012 Decisions. 1362.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012/1362

This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in 2012 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law
Digital Repository.

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 11-2060
____________
ATLANTIC HEALTH SYSTEM, INC; AHS HOSPITAL
CORP; ATLANTIC AMBULANCE CORP.,
Appellants
v.
NATIONAL UNION FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY
OF PITTSBURGH; AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL GROUP
___________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil No. 2-08-cv-01661)
District Judge: Honorable Garret E. Brown, Jr.
___________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1
February 10, 2012
Before:

SLOVITER and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges,
and POLLAK, * District Judge
(Filed February 29, 2012)
___________
OPINION OF THE COURT
___________

VANASKIE, Circuit Judge.
*

Honorable Louis H. Pollak, Senior Judge of the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.

Atlantic Health System, Inc., AHS Hospital Corp., and Atlantic Ambulance Corp.
(collectively, “AHS”) brought an action against National Union Fire Insurance Company
of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and American International Group (collectively, “National
Union”), 1 challenging the denial of coverage under an insurance policy. The District
Court granted National Union’s motion for summary judgment, and we will affirm.
I.
We write primarily for the parties, who are familiar with the facts and procedural
history of this case. Accordingly, we set forth only those facts necessary to our analysis.
On April 5, 2004, Med Alert Ambulance, Inc. (“Med Alert”) filed an antitrust
complaint against AHS. See Med Alert Ambulance, Inc. v. Atl. Health Sys., Inc., No. 041615, 2007 WL 2297335 (D.N.J. Aug. 6, 2007). AHS contends that it was entitled to
defense and indemnification in connection with the Med Alert action under its National
Union claims-made insurance policy that was in effect from May 1, 2003 to May 1,
2004. 2
On July 23, 2004, AHS sent a “First Notice of Loss” letter to National Union,
requesting coverage under Policy No. 316-29-70, which was effective from May 1, 2004
to May 1, 2005 (the “2004-2005 Policy”). The request for coverage under the 2004-2005
Policy was denied because AHS had notice of the underlying Med Alert claim prior to
the inception of the 2004-2005 Policy coverage.
1

National Union is a member company of American International Group.
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AHS ultimately settled the Med Alert action for $800,000, and allegedly incurred
more than $1.3 million in attorneys’ fees and costs in defending against the Med Alert
action.
2

On August 17, 2004, AHS sent a second letter to National Union marked “First
Report of a new loss” and requested coverage under Policy No. 382-77-89, which was in
effect from May 1, 2003 to May 1, 2004 (the “2003-2004 Policy”). That request was
denied because notice of the Med Alert claim had not been provided to National Union
during the policy period, or within the policy’s 30-day notice period. Because the Med
Alert action was filed on April 5, 2004, AHS was required under the terms of the 20032004 Policy to provide written notice of the Med Alert claim to National Union no later
than May 5, 2004.
Within the 2003-2004 policy period, however, AHS had submitted to National
Union two renewal applications, one handwritten and the other typed, that revealed
AHS’s involvement in the Med Alert suit. Specifically, AHS answered in the affirmative
the following questions on the renewal applications:
21. Has the Applicant, any of its Subsidiaries, any of its
Affiliates or any Director, Officer or Trustee:
(a) Been involved in any antitrust, copyright or patent
No
litigation?
X Yes
(b) Been charged in any civil or criminal action or
administrative proceeding with a violation of any federal or
state antitrust or fair trade law?
X Yes
No
....
(d) Been involved in any representative actions, class actions,
or derivative suits? X Yes
No
(A. 412a.) AHS further clarified these answers by noting that “AHS and Atlantic
Ambulance have been named, together with Newton Memorial Hospital, in a civil action
3

filed by Med Alert Ambulance Co. alleging unfair trade practices and anti-trust violations
with respect to the transport of cardiac patients from Newton to Morristown Memorial.”
(A. 337a.) The renewal applications were sent to Christine McSweeny, a National Union
underwriter who worked at 80 Pine Street, New York, NY.
Article VII of the 2003-2004 Policy, which is titled “NOTICE/CLAIM
REPORTING PROVISIONS,” states that “[n]otice hereunder shall be given in writing to
the Insurer named in Item 8 of the Declarations at the address indicated in Item 8 of the
Declarations.” (A. 93a.) Item 8 specifies that the address of National Union is “175
Water Street[,] New York, NY.” (A. 83a.) Though the renewal applications were not
sent to the Water Street address, AHS argued that statements made in the renewal
applications gave National Union actual notice of the Med Alert claim, and National
Union therefore should not have denied coverage under the 2003-2004 Policy. 3
AHS initiated this action in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, on
February 18, 2008. National Union removed the action to federal court on the basis of
diversity jurisdiction. AHS sought declaratory and monetary relief. National Union
argued as an affirmative defense that AHS’s requests for relief were barred by its failure
to provide timely notice of the Med Alert claim in accordance with the terms of the
policy. The parties presented their respective contentions to the District Court on cross
motions for summary judgment.
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On appeal, AHS does not contend that it was entitled to coverage under the
2004-2005 Policy, nor does it dispute that the August 17, 2004 letter was untimely under
the terms of the 2003-2004 Policy.
4

Applying New Jersey law, the District Court found that the AHS renewal
applications did not satisfy the claim reporting requirements of Article VII of the 20032004 Policy because “[t]he policy language at issue clearly requires written notice of a
claim to a specified address within a specified time period.” Atl. Health Sys., Inc., v.
Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., No. 2-08-cv-01661, 2011 WL 1375611, at
*5 (D.N.J. Apr. 20, 2011). Observing that strict adherence to the claims reporting
provisions in a claims-made policy is essential, and that it was indisputable that the
renewal applications were not sent to the address specified in the Policy, the District
Court granted summary judgment in favor of National Union.
II.
The District Court had diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and we have
appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review of a grant of summary
judgment is de novo, and we apply the same standard as the District Court. Pa. Coal
Ass’n v. Babbitt, 63 F.3d 231, 236 (3d Cir. 1995). “This requires that we view the
underlying facts and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the
party opposing the motion.” Id. Summary judgment shall be granted where no genuine
dispute exists as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).
We observe that the facts giving rise to this coverage contest are not in dispute.
What is in dispute are the legal consequences flowing from the undisputed facts.
Accordingly, we turn out attention to the questions of law arising from the historical facts
related above.
5

A.
AHS first contends that it did comply with Article VII of the 2003-2004 Policy,
because the renewal applications were “written” and were “given” to National Union:
There is nothing in the Policy that specifies any form or
format for the insured to follow in giving notice of the claim
to National Union, other than the notice must be in writing.
The District Court essentially read additional terms into the
Policy . . . . The Policy does not require notice to be ‘mailed.’
To the contrary, the Policy requires notice to be ‘given.’ The
undisputed facts before the District Court established that
AHS gave National Union actual notice of the Med Alert
claim in writing during the Policy Period.
(Appellant’s Br. at 18-19.)
The argument advanced by AHS is based upon a selective reading of Article VII
that disregards the policy directive that notice be given to National Union at a specifically
prescribed address. Titled “NOTICE/CLAIM REPORTING PROVISIONS,” Article VII
explicitly provides that “[n]otice hereunder shall be given in writing to the Insurer named
in Item 8 of the Declarations at the address indicated in Item 8 of the Declarations.” (A.
93a.) (emphasis added). There is no dispute that Item 8 identified National Union as the
“Insurer” and its address as 175 Water Street, New York, NY 10038. Though the
renewal applications were in writing, they were not given to National Union at its Water
Street address.
AHS contends that the failure to give notice at the Water Street address is
immaterial given that the Pine Street address to which the renewal applications were sent
is a mere “one-tenth of a mile away.” (Appellant’s Reply Br. at 14.) AHS concludes
that it is entitled to coverage under the 2003-2004 Policy because it is “undisputed . . .
6

that National Union actually received the renewal applications within the time specified
by the Policy.” (Appellant’s Reply Br. at 14.)
The parties agree that New Jersey law controls the interpretation of this claimsmade insurance policy. The leading case in New Jersey on this subject is Zuckerman v.
National Union Fire Insurance Co., 495 A.2d 395 (N.J. 1985), which held that the
reporting requirements of claims-made insurance policies must be applied strictly. The
Supreme Court of New Jersey explained that strict adherence to the claims reporting
requirements of a claims-made policy is based upon the fact that, unlike a typical
“occurrence” policy, in which coverage is triggered by an event within the policy period,
coverage under a claims-made policy is triggered by the transmittal of notice of the claim
within the policy period. The New Jersey high court elaborated:
In the “occurrence” policy, the peril insured is the
“occurrence” itself. Once the occurrence takes place,
coverage attaches even though the claim may not be made for
some time thereafter. While in the “claims made” policy, it is
the making of the claim which is the event and peril being
insured and, subject to policy language, regardless of when
the occurrence took place.
Id. at 398(quoting Sol Kroll, The Professional Liability Policy “Claims Made,” 13
FORUM 842, 843 (1978)). Because of this difference, explained the Court, “the
requirement of notice in an occurrence policy is subsidiary to the event that invokes
coverage, and the conditions related to giving notice should be liberally and practically
construed.” Id. at 406. In the claims-made context, however, the opposite is true, and
extending the notice period against the insurer “would be inequitable and unjustified.”
Id.
7

In American Casualty Co. of Reading, Pennsylvania v. Continisio, 17 F.3d 62 (3d
Cir. 1994), we acknowledged that Zuckerman attributed great significance to the fact that
“[n]otice provisions serve different purposes in occurrence and claims-made policies.”
Id. at 68. Notice provisions in an occurrence policy are given a liberal and practical
construction because they do not define coverage, but merely assist the insurer to
investigate and resolve claims. By way of contrast, as recognized in Zuckerman, the
coverage trigger in a claims-made policy is the submission of the claim. Id. We noted in
Continisio that “[c]laims-made policies are less expensive because underwriters can
calculate risks more precisely since exposure ends at a fixed point. Extension of time
periods would significantly increase both the risk to insurers and the cost to insureds.”
Id. We concurred with the Fifth Circuit in concluding that “[b]ecause notice of a claim or
potential claim defines coverage under a claims-made policy, we think that the notice
provisions of such a policy should be strictly construed.” Id. at 69 (quoting FDIC v.
Barham, 995 F.2d 600, 604 n.9 (5th Cir. 1993)).
AHS attempts to distinguish Continisio, asserting that Continisio was about
“constructive notice,” while the case at hand involves “actual notice.” As AHS explains,
“[i]n Continisio, the insured submitted a renewal application to its insurer in which it
denied knowledge of potential claims.” (Appellant’s Br. at 18.) The insurer, therefore,
had to draw an inference from the information provided in the rest of the application that
there was a possible claim.

AHS argues that the Third Circuit in Continisio was

“concerned about a situation ‘where the [insured’s] directors and officers would be better
served to disguise potential claims so that they would be covered by insurance well into
8

the future while not drawing attention to conduct that might increase future premiums, or
terminate coverage altogether.’” (Appellant’s Br. at 26.) (quoting Continisio, 17 F.3d at
68).
AHS contends that our concern in Continisio regarding misconduct is absent in the
case at hand: “unlike the insured in Continisio and the other cases cited by the Third
Circuit, AHS answered “YES” to the questions on both [renewal] applications asking for
disclosure of anti-trust litigation.” (Appellant’s Br. at 28.) AHS concludes that because
its renewal applications provided National Union with actual as opposed to constructive
notice, Continisio can be distinguished and AHS should be entitled to coverage under the
2003-2004 Policy.
AHS misreads Continisio. While misconduct and the concealment of potential
claims was one concern expressed in Continisio, we were also motivated by more
practical concerns. As we explained in that case, in the claims-made context:
[T]he only reasonable interpretation of the policy provision is
that the insureds must regard the information they possess as
a potential claim and formally notify their insurer through its
claims liability department that a claim may be asserted. . . .
[N]otice must be given through formal claims channels
because we recognize that the information needed, or at least
the perspective utilized in reviewing it, varies when
predicting the probability of future losses and recognizing the
need to investigate a claim that may be made based on past
occurrences.
Continisio, 17 F.3d at 69 (citations omitted). Similarly, an insured such as AHS must
give notice of a purportedly covered claim at the address specified by the insurer to
facilitate the claims-handling process.
9

AHS’s renewal application to National Union’s underwriters was simply not a
formal claim. AHS artfully ignores the fact that in Continisio we had specifically
concluded that it was not reasonable for “an insured [to] insist[] that its insurer’s
underwriting department sift through a renewal application and decide what should be
forwarded to the claims department on the insured’s behalf,” which is precisely what
AHS argues National Union should have done. Id. AHS was properly denied coverage
because it failed to strictly comply with the reporting requirements of its claims-made
policy.
B.
AHS argues, however, “that National Union waived its right to argue that notice of
[the] Med Alert claim did not comply with the terms of the Policy,” because “[i]f notice
provided to an insurer is considered by the insurer to be defective, good faith requires the
insurer to notify the insured of its objections within a reasonable time.” (Appellant’s Br.
at 38.) (citing FDIC v. Interdonato, 988 F. Supp. 1, 10 (D.D.C. 1997); Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ins. Corp. v. Burdette, 718 F. Supp. 649, 653 (E.D. Tenn. 1989); JPMorgan Chase & Co.
v. Travelers Indem. Co., 897 N.Y.S.2d 405 (App. Div. 2010)). AHS offers no New
Jersey authorities in support of this principle. Furthermore, the cases cited by AHS are
distinguishable.
In Burdette, the insured wrote to the insurer identifying probable claims with “the
purpose” of giving the insurer “notice of this potential.” 718 F. Supp. at 652. The
insurer, meanwhile, responded to these letters in a way that:
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[I]ndicated that [the insurer] thought notice was proper, as
claim files were opened and [the insurer] stated that it would
await the commencement of formal litigation against the
officers and directors before it would take any further action.
This is action consistent with the appearance that [the insurer]
believed notice was appropriate and that whenever a claim
was filed, it would act as if the claim was filed within the
policy period.
Id. at 654.
In Interdonato, similarly, the insured notified the insurer “of the possibility of
claims against the directors,” and the insurer responded in such a way that “implied that
[the insured] did not need to provide any additional notice relating to director liability
until a claim had been filed against them.” 988 F. Supp. at 10. Likewise, in JPMorgan
the insured informed the insurer via e-mail that it “anticipated” being “named in
litigation,” and listed a number of specific allegations that could be brought against the
insured. 897 N.Y.S.2d at 408. The insurer “acknowledge[ed] receipt of the
correspondence,” and informed the insured “of the name of the individual assigned to the
matter.” Id. It was not until the coverage litigation was commenced that the insurer first
asserted that the notice was deficient. As the court observed in that case, “[i]t is beyond
cavil that the entire purpose of the notice, from both the perspective of the insured and
the insurers . . . was ‘to [provide] . . . notice of the [impending litigation].’” Id. at 410
(citation omitted).
AHS, in contrast to the insureds in these cases, wrote of the Med Alert litigation in
its renewal applications to National Union’s underwriting department because it was
required to identify claims that would be excluded from coverage under a future policy.
11

As the District Court observed, “nothing about the renewal application purports to inform
the insurer that the insured is seeking to file a claim for coverage under an existing
policy.” Atl. Health Sys., Inc., 2011 WL 1375611, at *6.
“Waiver is the voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a known right.” Knorr
v. Smeal, 836 A.2d 794, 798 (N.J. 2003) (citations omitted). National Union, unlike the
insurers in the cases cited by AHS, did nothing to voluntarily and intentionally relinquish
its right to notice given in accordance with the Policy terms. The District Court again
properly noted that National Union never “represented – either affirmatively or tacitly –
that disclosure of claims on a renewal application would satisfy the notice-of-claim
requirement.” Atl. Health Sys., Inc., 2011 WL 1375611, at *6. Accordingly, we hold that
National Union did not waive the defect in the purported “actual notice” of the Med Alert
claim provided in the renewal applications.
C.
AHS last argues that “[t]he District Court erred in considering extrinsic evidence,”
because it had “found the policy language to be unambiguous.” (Appellant’s Br. at 37.)
Specifically, AHS disputes the District Court’s examination of “AHS’s prior and
subsequent history of submitting claims to the Water Street address,” which revealed that
AHS had a “history of compliance” with National Union’s notice-of-claim provisions.
Atl. Health Sys., Inc., 2011 WL 1375611, at *6.
As an initial matter, we note that even if we were to accept AHS’s argument here,
the result would be the same. If extrinsic evidence should not have been considered,
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AHS would be in precisely the same position – unable to recover because it failed to meet
the unambiguous notice requirements of the 2003-2004 Policy.
Nevertheless, we observe that “a policy of insurance is simply a contract and its
provisions should, of course, be construed as in any other contract.” Pennbarr Corp. v.
Ins. Co. of N. Am., 976 F.2d 145, 151 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting Caruso v. John Hancock
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 57 A.2d 359, 360 (N.J. 1948)). The Supreme Court of New Jersey has
held that it considers course of performance as relevant in the interpretation of contracts.
See State Troopers Fraternal Ass’n of N.J., Inc. v. State, 692 A.2d 519, 524 (N.J. 1997).
Clearly, the District Court did not err in considering AHS’s previous and subsequent
compliance with National Union’s notice-of-claim provisions.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 4
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In light of our conclusion on the defective notice issue, there is no need to
examine whether American International Group is separately liable to AHS.
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